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RECENT C.4SE NOTES
This is a basic principle in the analysis of all torts. Therefore the law sets
the limits upon the number of plaintiffs who can sue. Further, can the parties
by contract change tort law? The cases are definitely in the negative.2 5
Also, if a liability exists for gratuitous negligent conduct 2 6 undertaken for
another, it is difficult -to justify non-liability for conduct undertaken for a
consideration. Since Winterbottom v. Wright the increase in specialized activ-
ity engaged in under contract requires a revaluation of the relations of the
participants. 2 7 In many transactions involving banks, loan companies, pur-
chasers, and senders of mail matter, reliance in fact must be placed upon the
reasonably careful conduct of abstracters, inspectors, and mail contractors.
Thus, it is believed that the jurisdictions 2 8 which refuse the doctrine of Win-
terbottom v. Wright in cases of property damage as well as personal injury
cases announce the more desirable rule.
H. L. T.
MEASURE OF DAMAGES FOR FRAUD IN THE SALE OF REAL PROPERTY.-The
plaintiff, Sarah L. Pedaltry, contracted with the defendant company's agent to
purchase certain lots, the agent representing that he would resell the lots for
her immediately at a profit. At the time of making the contract plaintiff turned
over to defendant stocks as security for payment of the purchase price and a
contract she held to purchase another lot. The lots were never sold for her.
Later she contracted with a third party to purchase less valuable property for
which her interest in these lots was taken as part payment. In an action for
damages for fraud and deceit, plaintiff alleged that the defendant's agent made
the false representations about procuring a purchaser in order to get her
stock and sought to recover as damages its value plus interest. The trial court
awarded plaintiff a judgment for $16,997.64-. On appeal the Appellate Court
reversed the decision and remanded it for a new trial, holding that she was
not entitled to recover for fraud and deceit in absence of a showing of value,
if any, of the property which she received in exchange for her contract with
the defendant, notwithstanding her testimony that she had "lost everything."1
The promise of a vendor to resell property at a profit for a purchaser in
order to induce him to buy and without any intention of performing is fraud.2
25 MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co. (1916), 217 N. Y. 382; 111 N. E. 1050;
Glanzer v. Shepard (1922), 233 N. Y. 236, 135 N. E. 275; Dickle v. Nashville
Abstract Co. (1890), 89 Tenn. 431, 14 S. W. 896.
26 Coggs v. Bernard (1703), 2 Ld. Raym. 909, 27 Eng. Rul. Cas. 288; Nol-
ton v. Western R. Corp. (1857), 15 N. Y. 444, 69 Am. Dec., 623; Gregor v.
Cady (1889), 82 Me. 131, 19 A..108.
27 This is true not only as between the contracting parties and strangers,
but also as between the parties themselves. See the demand for liability on the
independent contractee for injuries occasioned by the negligent actions of inde-
pendent contractors in non-hazardous activity. Clarence Morris, The Torts
of an Independent Contractor (1934), 29 Ill. Law Rev. 339; Roscoe T. Steffen,
Independent Contractor and the Good Life (1935), 2 U. of Chicago Law Rev.
501.
28Ellis v. Lindmark (Minn., 1929), 225 N. W. 395; Dickle v. Nashville
Abstract Co. (1890), 89 Tenn. 431, 14 S. W. 896; Skaggs v. Missour-Kansas-
Texas R. Co. (1934), 228 Mo. App. 808, 73 S. W. (2d) 302.
1 Pedaltry v. George F. Nixon & Co. (11., 1937), 6 N. E. (2d) 290.
2 Boulevard Land Company v. King (Cal. App., 1932), 13 P. (2d) 864.
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The law is well settled that one who has been induced to enter into a contract
by fraud may rescind the contract and recover back the consideration paid,
or he may retain the money or property received thereon, and recover the dam-
ages sustained by the fraud. 3 Of course, he has no cause of action unless the
fraud has caused detriment,4 because fraud without resulting pecuniary damage
is not grounds for the exercise of remedial jurisdiction, either equitable or
legal. 5
Where the defrauded party brings an action on the case for damages for
deceit he has the burden of proof of the fraud and the damages caused thereby.6
There are two rules followed by courts in fixing damages for deceit. One,
the "Out of Pocket" rule, allows the injured party to recover the difference in
value between what he parted with under the fraudulent inducement and
what he received.7 Thus he recovers his actual loss. The other, the "Loss of
Bargain" rule, which is the weight of authority among state courts, allows him
to recoyer the difference between the actual value of what he received and
what he would have received if the representations had been true.8 Damages
will never be the full consideration paid unless what is received in return is
absolutely worthless.9 Usually what plaintiff receives is not without some value,
however small it may be.
Where the suit involves consequential damages, courts allow recovery of
such damages as naturally and proximately result from the fraud.' 0 In ar-
riving at a verdict the court considers the original consideration given, the
value of any personal or real property received in exchange therefor, the value
of any interest in the original contract or property which is still retained,'1
any outlays legitimately attributable to defendant's conduct,1 2 and any subse-
SKornblau v. McDermant (1916), 90 Conn. 624, 98 A. 587; Siltz v.
Springer (1908), 236 I1. 276, 85 N. E. 748; Ettlinger v. National Surety Co.
(1917), 221 N. Y. 467, 117 N. F.. 945; Sanders v. Hickman (Tex. Civ. App.,
1921), 235 S. W. 278; 2 Sedgwick, Damages, 842; 27 R. C. L. 379; 12 IL C.
L. 409.
4 Nunemacher v. Western Motor Transport Co. (Cal. App., 1927), 255
P. 266; Struve v. Tatge (1918), 285 Ill. 103, 120 N. E. 549; 2 Pomeroy, Equity
Jurisdiction (4th Ed.), sec. 898.
5 Black, Rescission & Cancellation, sec. 37; 2 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisdiction
(4th Ed.), sec. 898.
6 Roosevelt v. Mo. State Life Ins. Co. (1935), 78 F. (2d) 752; U. S. v.
Mammoth Oil Co. (1926), 14 F. (2d) 705; Kusha v. Vankat (1930), 341 Il1.
358, 173 N. E. 343; Means v. Flanagan (1898), 79 Ill. App. 296; Motzkus v.
Kamondy (1929), 248 Mich. 260, 226 N. W. 816.
7 Smith v. Bolles (1889), 132 U. S. 125, 10 S. Ct. 39; Sigafus v. Porter
(1900), 179 U. S. 116, 21 S. Ct. 34; Hotaling v. Leach & Co. (1898), 247 N. Y.
84, 159 N. E. 870, 57 A. L. R. 1136; Peek v. Derry (1887), L. R. 37 Ch. Div.
541; McCormick, Damages (1935), 451; 57 A. L. R. 1137.
8 Glindemann v. Ehrenpfort (1915), 29 Cal. App. 87, 154 P. 481; Johnson
v. Niles Invisible Door Check Co. (1921), 221 Ill. App. 65; Chesrown v. Black
(1910), 155 Ill. App. 422; Siltz v. Springer (1908), 236 I1. 276, 85 N. E. 748;
McCormick, Damages (1935), 451, and cases cited; 57 A. L. R. 1143, and
cases cited.
9 Chesrown v. Black (1910), 155 Il. 422.
10 Hotaling v. Leach & Co. (1928), 247 N. Y. 84, 159 N. E. 870; Peek v.
Derry (1887), L. R. 37 Ch. Div. 541; 57 A. L. R. 1137 ff.
11 Crater v. Binninger (1869), 33 N. J. L. 513, 97 Am. Dec. 737.
12 Medley v. Lamb (Tex. Civ. App., 1920), 223 S. W. 1048.
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quent events or circumstances calculated to aid in forming a correct estimate.1 3
Just how far courts will go in allowing recovery of miscellaneous kinds of con-
sequential damages depends on whether the contract theory of "contemplation
of party"1 4 or usual tort theory of "proximateness of the result"15 is adopted
as a measure.
The original doctrine, that in actions on the case the gist of the action
itself is the showing of actual damage and, hence, that without proof of
actual damage the action will fail and nominal damages even will not be al-
lowed, is still followed by courts in actions for fraud and deceit.16 Thus
where there is no actual damage proved there is no cause of action.1 7 To show
actual damage it is necessary for plaintiff to give enough evidence to show the
value of what he received and of what he lost, in order to show that he suf-
fered damage,' 8 unless the loss is on the face of his claim.19 Otherwise the
court does not know but that what he received was of equal or even greater
value than that with which he parted.2 0 Unless it was less, he has suffered no
actual damage. For example, recovery has been denied for depreciation in the
market value of iron where it was not shown how much was used or what
was done with the remainder; 2 1 for the full amount of notes purchased by
fraud because it was not shown how a settlement, which was made on the
notes, was made or what amount was paid;22 and for land on evidence that
it was the "poorest land in whole country." 2a There have been many cases
involving fraud in stock transactions in which recovery has been denied be-
cause of want of evidence of value to prove actual damage.2 4
Now, it is repeatedly announced by courts that, where in an action for
damages plaintiff establishes fact of loss, but not its amount, he may recover
nominal damages. 2 5 Whether in cases of fraud and deceit, where loss or dam-
age is an essential, merely establishing a substantial loss of an unknown
1a Campbell v. Hillman (1854), 15 B. Mon. (Ky.) 508.
14 Hadley v. Baxendale (1854), 9 Exch. 341.
15 Smith v. Bolles (1889), 132 U. S. 125, 10 S. Ct. 39.
16 Bailey v. Oatis (1911), 85 Kans. 339, 116 P. 830; Alden v. Wright (1891),
47 Minn. 225, 49 N. W. 767; McCormick, Damages (1935), 89.
17 West Florida Land Company v. Studebaker (1896), 37 Fla. 28, 19 So.
176; Russell v. Industrial Transportation Co. (1923), 113 Tex. 441, 251 S. W.
1034.
18Bingham v. Fish (1916), 89 N. J. L. 688, 99 A. 337; 12 R. C. L. 423.
19 Westerfeld v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co. (1910), 157 Cal. 339, 107 P. 699.
20 North American Savings & Loan Association v. Phillips (Colo., 1934),
31 P. (2d) 492; Globe Yarn Mills v. Armstrong (1926), 191 N. C. 125, 131
S. E. 416.
21 Mueller Furnace Company v. Cascade Foundry (1906), 145 F. 596.
22 Blythe v. Simmons (1914), 107 Miss. 510, 65 So. 571.
23 West Florida Land Company v. Studebaker (1896), 37 Fla. 28, 19 So. 176.
24 Glindemann v. Ehrenpfort (1915), 29 Cal. App. 87, 154 P. 481; North
American Savings & Loan Association v. Phillips (Colo., 1934), 31 P. (2d)
492; Carlson v. Burg (1917), 137 Minn. 53, 162 N. W. 889; Lams v. Fish
(1914), 86 N. J. L. 321, 90 A. 1105.
25 Van Velsor v. Seeberger (1895), 59 Il1. App. 322 (condition of house
falsely represented and deteriorated afterwards in numerous ways, but amount
of damage not shown); Gluck v. Hotchner (1919), 176 N. Y. S. 756; Sanders
v. Hickman (Tex. Civ. App., 1921), 235 S. W. 278; Storseth v. Folsom (1908),
50 Wash. 456, 97 P. 492; Jesse v. Tinkham (Wis., 1932), 239 N. W. 455; Mc-
Cormick, Damages (1935), 91.
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amount, rather than actual amount of loss, satisfies the requirement, to the
extent of entitling plaintiff to nominal damages, is an open question. Earlier
and stricter judges would have answered "no." But today the trend is toward
allowing nominal damages and a prediction is that the answer will be "yes" in
the future.2 6
For example, a Washington Court gave nominal damages to plaintiff when
he showed evidence of the cost of an entire road though only part of it was
obstructed by defendant.27 Another court allowed the defrauded party to keep
the land and recover the full contract price therefor on an allegation that the
land was worthless and without market value.2 8
The decision of the trial court in the principal case seems to extend the
doctrine of nominal damages to actions for deceit. In doing this they apparently
find that the allegation, "lost everything," establishes substantial loss of an
unknown amount. Thus they awarded plaintiff the value of her stock and
interest which seems a fair verdict if "lost everything" means what the words
suggest.
There are two possible ways to uphold the reversal of this decision. First,
if the Appellate Court adheres to the strict rule that, in the absence of a show-
ing of the amount of damages suffered, plaintiff can recover nothing, it was
entirely correct in reversing the decision. No matter which rule would be em-
ployed in determining plaintiff's damages, in order to ascertain them in dollars
and cents, the court must know what she received in this second transaction.
Now, on the other hand, if pecuniary damage is necessary in an action for
fraud and deceit even to recover nominal damages, the Appellate Court was
quite right in reversing the decision because without a showing of the extent
of the failure of consideration in her transaction with the third party, she has
not shown even the fact of pecuniary damage, much less the amount. In the
absence of any showing in the case as to why the court demanded evidence of
what became of the contract other than that she "lost everything," the writer
submits that the second rationale is better.
M. J. W.
IMPLIED EASEMENTS-WAYS OF NECESSITY AS INVOLVED IN EMINENT DOMAIN
PRocEEDINGs.-Defendant owned in her own right 120 acres of land to which
the only means of ingress and egress to and from the public highway was by a
private way running along the north side thereof and over certain land held
by her and her husband as tenants by the entirety. In these circumstances the
state, under a complaint which purported to deprive the defendant of all her
right, title, and interest, condemned for forestry purposes a strip off the north
side of the dominant estate which included the way in question. In the pro-
ceeding below the damages were assessed upon the assumption that the de-
fendant was cut off from all access to the public way. Appeal by the State.
26Teets v. Hahn (1927), 5 N. J. Misc. 538, 137 A. 559; Douglas v. Ohio
River R. Co. (1902), 51 W. Va. 523, 1 S. E. 911; McCormick, Damages (1935),
91.
27 Storseth v. Folsom (1908), 50 Wash. 456, 97 P. 492.
28 Lian V. Henry Bradford & Co. (1920), 209 Mich. 172, 176 N. W. 412.
